THE ROLE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN FAMILY CONTROL FIRMS: EVIDENCE FROM INDONESIA by Feliana, Yie Ke & Liantina, Suwenda
13th UBAYA INTERNATIONAL ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM ON MANAGEMENT 
 
 
ISBN: 978-602-73852-0-7  1 
 
THE ROLE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN FAMILY CONTROL 
FIRMS: EVIDENCE FROM INDONESIA  
 
Yie Ke Feliana 
Suwenda Liantina 
Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Surabaya 
yiekefeliana@staff. ubaya.ac.id 
 
ABSTRACT 
Companies in ASEAN are generally family control firms. Family control firms have specific 
agency problem that may affect the company’s performance in two different ways, entrenchment 
and alignment effects. As arguing, corporate governance mechanism in the company should 
mitigate the agency problem. This study examines the effect of corporate governance mechanism 
in family control firms to the firm performance. Using 536 Indonesian listed companies data 
from 2011-2012, this study find that corporate governance mechanism in family control firms 
are tend to looser than non-family control firms. Family control firms are smaller and higher debt 
level than non-family control firms. In addition, the firm performance of family control firms is 
not significantly different from non-family control firms. However, higher proportion of 
independent board increases family control firm performance. On the other hand, higher quality 
of external auditor reduces family control firm performance, although in general higher quality 
of external auditor increases firm performance.    
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Research Background 
Since La Porta (1999) discover that mostly firms in 27 countries have concentrated 
ownership with family or state as controlling shareholders, extensive studies have been done 
about the impact of this kind of ownerships. Claessens et al. (2000) study also provides evidence 
that majority firms in East Asian countries are family controlled firms. Indonesia companies 
provide specific evidence because they show largest family control firms and largest number of 
company control by single family, comparing to others East Asian countries. More recent data 
family firms in Indonesia are provided in Djatmiko (2011) that still show dominance of family 
control in Indonesia firms, i.e. 90% of 160.000 companies are family firms, even listed Indonesia 
companies on Indonesia Stock Exchange are majority family firms.  
Concentration of ownership in family business reduces first type of agency problem, but 
increases second type of agency problem (Young et al., 2003; Gilson and Gordon, 2003; Su et 
al., 2008). Further, family business has specific characteristics. That both of them may affect the 
company performance in two different ways (Morck et al., 1988; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; 
Claessens et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 2002; Anderson and Reeb, 2003).  
Pricewaterhouse and Coopers (PwC) has done seven regular survey of family business around 40 
countries from 2002 to 2014. The report (PwC, 2014) concludes that family business is grown, 
but need to work more on governance. Therefore, this study examine whether corporate 
governance mechanism moderate the effect of family control on firm performance. 
The result of this study shows that only independent board moderate the effect of family 
control on firm performance. In addition, generally corporate governance mechanism in family 
firms tends to looser than non-family firms, although the firm performances are not significantly 
different between them.  
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Literature Review 
1. Second type agency problem 
Agency theory predicts that in company where there is separation between ownership and 
control; there is conflict between principal and agent (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). The theory was built on widely held corporation assumption, and then it is 
known as type one agency problem. The shareholders are as the principal, and the managers are 
as the agent.  
In concentration held corporation, the managers are controlled tightly by majority 
shareholders, while minority shareholders have low access to control the managers. Thus, the 
agency problem occurs between majority shareholders and minority shareholders of companies 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Dharwakar et al., 2000; Young et al., 2003; Su et al., 2008; Zu and 
Ma, 2009). 
2. Family firms 
Family controlled firms are firms where founder or founding family member or founding 
family successor maintains presence in the firm as a shareholder, director, or manager (Larcker 
and Tayan, 2016). Family firms have some characteristics that may effect to the company 
performance, in two different ways. First effect is alignment. Family has significant ownership 
on the firm, therefore it decrease probability of free-riding behaviour (Gomes, 2000). On the 
other hand, family owner has more long term orientation decision (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Family owner generally has plan to inherit the company to the next 
generation in order to maintain family reputation, their “legacy”, in the business (Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Further, key management functions are posited by 
family members (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). It makes tighter 
control on management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Second effect is entrenchment. Due to majority ownership, family owner has effective 
control on company resources. Controls by majority shareholders are tighter in family firm, than 
other type majority owner, because family owner tend to have more cohesive interest (Villalonga 
and Amit, 2006). Being a controller, they can expropriate the company resources for their private 
interest (Claessens et al. 1999).   
Both of these two effects are still supported in extensive empirical research. Due to two 
strong arguments about the effect of family control, the effect of family control on firm financial 
performance is an empirical result on this study. 
H1: Financial performance of family controlled firms and non-family controlled firms are 
different. 
3. Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is defined as the system by which company companies are directed 
and controlled (Cadbury Report, 1992). Traditionally, corporate governance is developed to 
solve agency problem, thus in a narrow view corporate governance is directed to shareholder 
interest. Nowadays, broader view is developed which include accountability to stakeholders, 
rather than only shareholders (Solomon, 2013; Larcker and Tayan, 2016).  
The organ of corporate governance includes board directors, and also board commissioner 
(in two tier system countries), audit committee, remuneration and nomination committee and 
other committee (Cadbury Report, 1992, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2004).  
Indonesia is one of countries that apply two tier system. There are two separate boards: a 
management board (board of directors) and a supervisory board (board of commissioner). While 
other countries apply one-tier system, there is only one board. 
One of ultimate test whether corporate governance of a company works effectively is 
having positive impact on company financial performance (Solomon, 2013; Larcker and Tayan, 
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2016). However, there have been mixed results regarding the relationship between them based 
on the review by Finegold et al. (2007).   
In family controlled firm corporate governance should focus on protecting outside 
shareholders from harming family shareholders interest, as arguing in Larker and Tayan (2016). 
Based on analysis of Tabalujan (2012) using Indonesian company sample, corporate governance 
in family controlled firm is looser, due to three reasons. First, the notion of a company being a 
separate legal entity from family may be blurred. This may explain the cases of expropriation of 
company assets by majority shareholders. Secondly, personal accountability of board members 
may be downplayed. Thirdly, supervision and authority within the two-tier board structure of 
Indonesian companies may be less than optimal given a hierarchical family culture. Evidence 
from another country is provided in Hassan et al. (2014) study. It shows that family controlled 
firm have lower corporate governance practices in Bangladesh. 
In conclusion, there are extensive previous studies that provide mixed result regarding the 
influence of corporate governance on company performance. The corporate governance in 
family firms is unique. Therefore this study makes no directional hypothesis as follows. 
H2: Corporate governance practice in family control company mitigates the effect family control 
on company performance. 
 
Research Method 
Population of this study is Indonesia listed companies 2010-2012, excluding financial 
industry companies. From the 1.090 firm years population, only 667 firm years fulfil sample 
requirement (Table 1).  
Table 1 
Sample Description 
Description 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Listed companies in non-financial industries  341 364 385 1,090 
Less: Not available annual report  95 118 140 353 
         Reporting currency other than local currency  15 16 39 70 
Potential sample 231 230 206 667 
Less: Outliers 46 46 39 131 
Final sample 185 184 167 536 
   
Firm financial performance is measured by Tobin Q (Q). As arguing in Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001), and Demsetz and Lehn (1985); Tobin Q is more representative of company 
performance due to two reasons. First, it shows future firm performance than historical 
performance as in some financial ratios. Second, it is freer from manipulation and accounting 
standard bias because it is accounted by market value. However, the weakness of Tobin Q is the 
assumption that the market is efficient, that sometimes is not happened.  
Family control in a company can be active control by become CEO of the company or 
passive control by become only shareholders. In this study family control are measured by two 
variables, i.e. dummy variable of family ownership (FOWN) and dummy variable of family 
CEO (FCEO). FOWN is valued 1 if the largest shareholder of the company is family, and 0 if 
otherwise. In Indonesia there in no extensive list of family firms, thus family owner are 
identified by shareholders are people, some people who have same family names, or private 
company, in line to La Porta (1999).  FCEO is valued 1 if the CEO of the company is the same 
person in list of company shareholders or has same family as person in list of company 
shareholders.  
Corporate governance practices in a company are proxy by 6 variables, i.e. supervisory 
board size (BS), independent supervisory director (INDB), existence of audit committee (EAC), 
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audit committee size (ACS), financial expertise audit committee member (FEAC), and quality of 
external auditor (QEA). BS is measured by the number of supervisory board member. INDB is 
proportion of independent supervisory director to total supervisory board member. EAC is a 
dummy variable, which is 1 if the company has audit committee, and 0 is otherwise. ACS is 
measured by the number of audit committee member. FEAC is a dummy variable, which is 1 if 
there is audit committee member who has financial expertise, in term of educational background 
or working experience; and 0 if otherwise. QEA is a dummy variable, which is 1 if the external 
auditor of the company is affiliated to the BIG4 (KPMG, PWC, EY and Deloitte).    
Control variables are company leverage (LEV) and company size (SZ).  LEV is measured 
by proportion of total company debt to total assets. SZ is measured by Ln of total assets. 
Corporate governance and firm financial characteristics data are collected from firm annual 
reports that are available on Indonesian Stock Exchange website. The market value of equity is 
collected from Fact Book by Indonesian Stock Exchange. 
The two hypotheses are tested by multiple ordinary least square regression as in equation 
(1). All data have been tested whether fulfil classic assumption requirement (multicolleniarity, 
normality, autocorrelation, and heteroscedasticity).  
                                                                         
                                                                                  
                                                                            
                 (1) 
 
Result and Discussion 
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive of data. The number of sample firms controlled by 
family is almost same as firms controlled by not-family. Only few companies who has CEO 
from family members. This shows that now family firms are managed by professional 
unaffiliated person. Board size of sample firms are 4 members which 40% are independent board 
member. Audit committee sizes of firms are 3 members. Almost all firms have audit committee 
that majorly have financial expertise member. Majority of firms are audited by Non- Big4 
auditors.  
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A Ratio Scale Variables 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Q 0.045 4.097 1.114 0.494 
BS 2 10 3.95 1.605 
INDB 0 1 0.405 0.121 
ACS 0 7 3.06 0.565 
LEV 0.004 3.210 0.506 0.349 
SZ 23.053 34.472 27.804 1.637 
 
Panel B Nominal Scale Variables 
 0 1 
FOWN 
248 
(47.8%) 
271 
(52.2%) 
FCEO 
515 
(99.2%) 
4 
(0.8%) 
EAC 
4 
(0.8%) 
515 
(99.2%) 
FEAC 
56 
(10.8%) 
463 
(89.2%) 
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QEA 
378 
(72.8%) 
141 
(27.2%) 
 
Table 3 illustrates correlation between variables. Family controlled firms have significant 
higher leverage and smaller than non-family controlled firms. Corporate governance practices in 
family controlled firm in general is looser than non-family control firms, i.e. smaller board size, 
lower independent board proportion, smaller audit committee size, less financial expertise 
member in audit committee. 
Table 3 
Correlation Matrix between Variables 
 Q FOWN FCEO  BS INDB EAC ACS QEA FEAC LEV SZ 
Q Correlation 1 0,080 -0,017 0,233** 0,026 0,017 0,092* 0,232** -0,018 0,515** 0,212** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
0,064 0,700 0,000 0,545 0,696 0,033 0,000 0,684 0,000 0,000 
FOWN Correlation 0,061 1 0,083 -0,145** -0,125** -0,060 -0,116** -0,045 -0,100* 0,179** -0,271** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0,161  0,055 0,001 0,004 0,167 0,007 0,301 0,021 0,000 0,000 
FCEO Correlation 0,003 0,083 1 -0,052 -0,052 0,003 -0,009 -0,055 -0,181** 0,100* -0,103* 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0,937 0,055  0,230 0,226 0,951 0,834 0,207 0,000 0,020 0,017 
BS Correlation 0,218** -0,176** -0,056 1 -0,006 -0,019 0,210** 0,261** 0,133** 0,026 0,445** 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0,000 0,000 0,197  0,883 0,660 0,000 0,000 0,002 0,552 0,000 
INDB Correlation 0,230 -0,121** -0,075 0,078 1 0,061 0,089* -0,034 -0,061 0,065 0,118** 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0,596 0,005 0,085 0,071  0,159 0,039 0,436 0,158 0,134 0,006 
EAC Correlation -0,009 -0,055 0,005 0,011 0,088* 1 0,325** 0,019 0,188** -0,050 0,002 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0,834 0,200 0,907 0,798 0,042  0,000 0,657 0,000 0,248 0,966 
ACS Correlation 0,132** -0,145** -0,010 0,244** 0,124** 0,238** 1 0,246** 0,227** -0,044 0,258** 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0,002 0,001 0,816 0,000 0,004 0,000  0,000 0,000 0,308 0,000 
QEA Correlation 0,250** -0,045 -0,055 0,265** 0,026 0,037 0,206** 1 0,163** 0,004 0,445** 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0,000 0,301 0,207 0,000 0,548 0,397 0,000  0,000 0,934 0,000 
FEAC Correlation 0,044 -0,100* -0,181** 0,162** -0,023 0,231** 0,198** 0,163** 1 -0,189** 0,179** 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0,311 0,021 0,000 0,000 0,594 0,000 0,000 0,000  0,000 0,000 
LEV Correlation 0,319** 0,177** 0,096* 0,020 0,058 -0,055 0,000 0,046 -0,096* 1 -0,009 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0,000 0,000 0,027 0,644 0,177 0,206 0,996 0,290 0,037    0,843 
SZ Correlation 0,256** -
0,277** 
-0,105* 0,468** 0,172** -0,004 0,211** 0,451** 0,175** 0,052 1 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0,000 0,000 0,015 0,000 0,000 0,928 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,230  
** = significant at 1%, * = significant at 5%. 
Pearson correlation is on upper right hand side, and Spearman correlation is on lower left hand side. 
 
Table 4 shows univariate t-test six corporate governance practices in family and non-
family companies. The board size, independent supervisory board member, and audit committee 
size are different significantly between family and non-family controlled firms. This result is 
consistent to the correlation table on table 3, that family controlled firms have looser corporate 
governance practice than non-family controlled firms. 
 
The main result is shown on table 5. Financial performance of family controlled firms are 
not significantly different from non-family controlled firms, thus H1 is rejected. This result may 
support the two contradiction effects, i.e. alignment and entrenchment effects. The relationship 
between corporate governance and financial performance are only significant positive in term of 
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board size and quality of external auditor. The insignificant relationship family ownership and 
firm performance is consistent to Mang’unyi (2011). But it is not consistent to Martin-Reyna and 
Duran-Enclada (2012) and Connelly et al. (2012). Martin-Reyna and Duran-Enclada (2012) find 
that family ownership in Mexico have positive significant relationship to Tobin Q, on the other 
hand, Connelly et al. (2012) find that higher family ownership reduce Tobin Q in Thailand firms. 
 
Table 4 
Univariate t-test 
 Levene’s for Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2 tailed) 
BS Equal variances assumed 
Equal variances not assumed 
2,086 0,149 3,667 
3,648 
665 
630,405 
0,000 
0,000 
INDB Equal variances assumed 
Equal variances not assumed 
1,979 0,160 3,142 
3,150 
665 
651,988 
0,002 
0,002 
EAC Equal variances assumed 
Equal variances not assumed 
0,157 0,692 1,359 
1,321 
665 
534,741 
0,175 
0,187 
ACS Equal variances assumed 
Equal variances not assumed 
3,879 0,049 2,432 
2,420 
665 
632,508 
0,015 
0,016 
QEA Equal variances assumed 
Equal variances not assumed 
5,702 0,017 1,212 
1,208 
665 
637,876 
0,226 
0,227 
FEAC Equal variances assumed 
Equal variances not assumed 
8,173 0,004 1,417 
1,435 
665 
664,598 
0,157 
0,152 
 
Table 5 
Regression 
Variables Β Sig, of t-test 
Constant -0,730 0,071 
FOWN 0,183 0,361 
FCEO -0,277 0,203 
BS 0,038 0,024* 
INDB -0,291 0,129 
EAC 0,205 0,247 
ACS 0,059 0,208 
FEAC -0,044 0,668 
QEA 0,365 0,000** 
FOWN*BS 0,021 0,376 
FOWN*INDB 0,140 0,044* 
FOWN* EAC 0,017 0,954 
FOWN*  ACS -0,082 0,272 
FOWN* FEAC 0,089 0,501 
FOWN* QEA -0,390 0,000** 
LEV 0,794 0,000** 
SZ 0,035 0,013* 
Sig, of F-test 0.000** 
Adjusted R
2
 38.3% 
** = significant at 1%, * = significant at 5%. 
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H2 is supported only 2 from 6 corporate governance practices. The higher proportion of 
independent supervisory board members in family controlled firms increase the firm 
performance. Independent supervisory board can mitigate the strong family control on 
management, therefore reducing conflict of interest between family as majority shareholders, and 
non-family as minority shareholders. As a result, this may increase investor perception about the 
family firm performance. While, hiring big4 auditors in family controlled firms reduce firm 
performance. Combining descriptive, correlation and regression result, it can be conclude that 
family controlled firms are smaller in size, as shown on table 2 and 3, and Big4 auditors are 
hired by larger firms, as shown on positive correlation between QEA and Q on table 3. 
Therefore, hiring big 4 auditor in family controlled firms are viewed as in-efficiency than to 
tighter corporate governance practice.  
Two control variables are significantly positive influence firm performance. That higher 
leverage firms are viewed as growing companies, although it increases financial risk of the firms, 
thus increase Tobin Q company.  
 
Conclusions 
Family controlled firms have higher second type agency problem, although lower first type 
agency problem.  Corporate governance is intended to prevent self-interested managers from 
engaging in activities detrimental to the welfare of shareholders and stakeholders (Larker and 
Tayan, 2016). The result of this study supports argument that there is “no one-size-fits-all” best 
corporate governance practices (Larker and Tayan, 2016). In family controlled firms that are 
commonly in East Asian countries only the independent supervisory board is effective to balance 
the interest of family owners as majority shareholders and non-family owner as minority 
shareholders, thus show positive association to firm performance. 
This study has some limitations. First, it only use short term financial performance and 
only Tobin Q. Family firms have long-term orientation, therefore it may be better to measure 
their performance in longitudinal studies. Second, the sample of this studies are only listed 
companies, however family control are stronger in private companies. Lastly, identification of 
family or non-family firms are based on direct shareholders, that may be lower accurate than 
ultimate shareholders. These last two limitations are happened due to unaccessabililty of data in 
Indonesia. In term of the last two limitations, this study result may understate the family control. 
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